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THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND THE FAIR 
HOUSING ACT: JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES FOR 
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING CHALLENGES AFTER 
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS 
Carol R. Cohen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While American cities are foundering in deep social and economic 
peril, the suburbanization of their metropolitan areas has occurred 
with amazing speed and consequent prosperity.' Each year, the 
metropolitan areas of the United States increase by one half million 
acres and, by 1978, the flight of affluent whites to the suburbs will 
have created suburban rings with a population fifty per cent greater 
than that of the cities they circumscribe.2 Accompanying this phen-
omenon is the gradual shift of industry and jobs from the cities to 
the suburbs to meet the needs of economic growth and to escape the 
pressures of inner-city crime and decay. 3 
The effect of this suburbanization on minority and low income 
families has been the focus of recent studies. Three national com-
missions were formed to investigate the problem of racial and eco-
nomic polarization in metropolitan areas.4 These studies inevitably 
led to a consideration of suburban zoning policies, in particular, the 
* Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
I See D. MANDELKER & R. MONTGOMERY, HOUSING IN AMERICA, PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 
177 (1973). 
2 PRESIDENT's COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 137 (1969) [hereinafter cited 
as Kaiser Commission Report]. 
3 See E. BERGMAN, introduction to ELIMINATING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING; RECONCILING WORK-
PLACE, AND RESIDENCE IN SUBURBAN AREAS (1974). 
• NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as Douglas Commission Report]; REpORT ON THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kerner Report]; Kaiser 
Commission Report, supra note 2. 
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policy of "exclusionary zoning."5 Such zoning restrictions have been 
characterized as a perpetuation of residential patterns caused by 
decades of discrimination. 8 In fact, one report prepared for the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights called this economic-
racial exclusion, "The racism of the seventies."7 
The state has the authority to regulate land use through its broad 
discretionary powers to provide for the health, safety, and welfare 
of the public.8 This authority has been almost completely delegated 
to local zoning boards.9 With the power to zone comes a presump-
tion of constitutionality and the burden is on the challenger of a 
zoning ordinance to prove that a contested ordinance is arbitrary or 
unreasonable. to Moreover, the courts have shown an extreme reluct-
ance to review zoning cases at all, due to the complexities of most 
zoning procedures and to the administrative rather than legal char-
acter of most zoning disputes. II Nevertheless, with the housing shor-
tage and unemployment reaching crisis proportions, exclusionary 
zoning has been frequently challenged in the courts in the last de-
cade on the ground that it violates those rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.12 
Prior to 1974, the only Supreme Court precedent for judicial re-
view of a zoning decision was Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 
which was decided in 1926 on due process grounds. 13 In that case, 
the Court upheld the validity of the ordinances declaring that the 
plaintiffs had not sustained the burden of proving the absence of a 
• See M. BROOKS, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 3 (1970). 
I See R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING; LAND USE REGULATION AND Hous-
ING IN THE 1970's 10 (1973). 
7 See THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RiGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA 7 
(1974). 
• This authority has been derived from the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution which 
provides that: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." . 
The Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), affirmed this zoning 
authority. "The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, must find 
their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare." [d. at 
387. 
I See C. LAMB, LAND USE POLmcs AND LAW IN THE 1970's 5 (1975) (monograph). 
II R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 67 n. 20 (1968). 
II See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POUCIES 101-11 (1969). 
12 See BROOKS, supra note 5, at 13-27 in which are discussed Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 
F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970); Southern Alameda Spanish 
Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 
425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970). 
13 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
1977] EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 65 
substantial relationship to the public welfare. 14 Because of the diffi-
culties which this standard presented for those outside the com-
munity who wished to challenge a municipality's zoning ordinance, 
the rights afforded under the equal protection clause, amplified and 
clarified during the 1960's, have been invoked to attack exclusionary 
zoning. 15 
During the past six years, several cases have successfully chal-
lenged the constitutionality of low-income and minority exclusion.18 
The federal courts of appeals decided these cases under the equal 
protection standard of review developed by the Supreme Court to 
remedy segregation, specifically in the schools. 17 A representative 
case was Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp. which was reviewed by the Supreme Court in the 
last term.IS Analysis of the decision in Arlington Heights requires a 
review of the narrowing standard being applied in equal protection 
cases. In particular, the 1976 decision of the Supreme Court in 
Washington v Davis,19 an employment discrimination case, reveals 
specific departures from previous equal protection cases. The Court 
in Arlington Heights reaffirmed the Davis standard requiring the 
showing of discriminatory purpose rather than the showing of dis-
criminatory effect.20 Arlington Heights dramatically affects the con-
tinuing efforts, organizationally and individually, to eradicate ex-
clusionary zoning. 
Following an analysis of the holding in Arlington Heights, this 
article investigates the concept of "motivation" as it relates to 
mounting an effective equal protection challenge to a zoning ordi-
nance. Then the article examines the effect of the shift from the 
"impact" to the "motivation" standard of review on the merger of 
wealth and racial classifications in zoning cases. On the basis of the 
conclusions reached from these consideratons, the article discusses 
.. Id. at 397. 
" Zoning-Equal Protection, 1976 WIse. L. REv. 234. 
" See, e.g., Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. V. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 
291 (9th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 
1970); United Farmworkers of Fla. Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 
799 (5th Cir. 1974). 
17 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
" 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
" 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
20 97 S. Ct. 555, 563 (1977). 
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the viability of the equal protection clause as a tool for attacking 
discriminatory zoning. 
As a judicial alternative to an equal protection challenge, this 
article will focus on the statutory rights guaranteed by the Fair 
Housing Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1968.21 In particular, 
it will be proposed that the statutory standard of review should be 
based on a prima facie showing of racially discriminatory effect, 
because Congress intended the courts to interpret the Fair Housing 
Act liberally in order to eradicate all forms of segregated housing. 
Moreover, the courts have established this prima facie case as the 
standard for determining discrimination in other areas of personal 
and societal rights protected by Civil Rights legislation. 
II. BACKGROUND FOR THE Arlington Heights DECISION 
A. Application of the "New" Equal Protection: Two Tier 
Standard of Review 
The era of the Warren Court was renown for the breakdown of 
some of the more formidable barriers to true social equality,22 which 
existed for blacks and for many disadvantaged minorities. 23 Reform-
ers used the formerly dormant equal protection clause to accomplish 
these advances.24 The doctrinal framework which was developed by 
the Court to determine the validity of these equal protection chal-
lenges was a two tier standard of review. 25 The courts decided most 
cases alleging a violation of the equal protection clause under a 
doctrine of restrained review. This doctrine placed the burden on 
the challenger of a statute to show that the classification bore no 
reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.26 This 
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1973). 
22 For a broader, if somewhat superficial overview of the Warren Court years see generally 
J. WEAVER, WARREN, THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA (1967). For a more scholarly, but more 
circumscribed treatment, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 73-110 (1964). 
23 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (marriage and procreation); Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) 
(interstate travel and welfare); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Fronti-
ero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex). 
,. See Tussman & tenBrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 
(1949). 
23 See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969) [herein-
after cited as Developments]. 
" See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); F. S. Royster Guano 
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Railway Express 
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
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burden was very difficult to sustain, and equal protection challenges 
to legislation which would be subjected to such minimum scrutiny 
have been virtually abandoned. 27 
The Court decided, however, that certain classifications should 
trigger a more active review. These classifications dealt with suspect 
criteria or involved a "fundamental interest."28 Any classification 
based on race,29 alienage,30 or ancestry,31 or infringing on rights such 
as the right to vote32 or access to the criminal appeal process33 would 
require strict scrutiny by the courts. Such scrutiny would shift the 
burden to the state to show that the legislation in question served a 
compelling state interest and that the involved classification was 
the least restrictive means available. 34 The result was that if strict 
scrutiny was applied and the burden of proof shifted to the state, 
the legislation was almost always ruled unconstitutiona1.35 
It is highly unlikely that any legislation containing an explicit 
racial classification could meet the strict scrutiny standards.38 How-
ever, some laws contain only de facto classifications which, though 
not discriminatory on their face, operatively discriminate on the 
basis of race. or in violation of a fundamental right. These laws, too, 
have been subjected to strict scrutiny by the courts.37 Since the 
27 See Developments, supra note 25, at 1087. 
28 See Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1645, 1650 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as Exclusionary Zoning]; see also Developments, supra note 25, at 1087-
1103. 
29 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
3. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
3\ In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
32 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
33 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
34 See Developments, supra note 25, at 1101-02. 
35 [d. at 1090. 
" The only explicit racial classification which met the burden of compelling state interest 
to the Supreme Court's satisfaction was Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
which involved the internment of Japanese and Japanese-Americans during World War II. 
The Court held that the statute was justifiable on the basis of war-time emergency measures 
dealing with national security. But Justice Black, speaking for the Court, went on to say: 
It should be noted. . . that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are 
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. 
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial 
antagonism never can. 
[d. at 216. 
37 See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. 
Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub. nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 
1969)(education); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)(criminal process). 
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Supreme Court in Buchanan v. Warley38 struck down an explicitly 
racially discriminatory zoning ordinance in 1917, most zoning chal-
lenges have involved those zoning regulations which, while not fa-
cially discriminatory, operate to exclude minorities.3u The Metro-
politican Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington 
Heights suit was filed alleging this type of discrimination. 
B. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of 
Arlington Heights: The Opinions of the Lower Courts 
The plaintiff in Arlington Heights was a non-profit organization 
which had leased with an option to purchase a fifteen acre parcel 
of land in the Chicago suburb of Arlington Heights. 40 Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corporation (MHDC) proposed to build Lin-
coln Green, a 190 unit townhouse complex for low and moderate 
income families which would be federally subsidized under Section 
236 of the National Housing Act of 1934.41 In order to proceed, 
MHDC applied for a zoning change from R-3 (single-family) to R-5 
(multi-family).42 The Village Plan Commission rejected the applica-
tion although MHDC made various changes in the submitted plans 
to attempt to satisfy some of the Plan Commission's objections.43 
MHDC then filed suit claiming that this rejection constituted racial 
discrimination against minority groups who worked and wished to 
38 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
3t See, e.g., Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 
(9th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970); Warth V. Selden, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) . 
.. This land belongs to the Clerics of St. Viator, a Catholic religious order. It constituted 
the southeast corner of an eighty acre property on which is situated the order's novitiate and 
high school. The Clerics selected MHDC to develop the land with the proviso that subsidized 
low-income housing would be constructed. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of 
Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,411 (7th Cir. 1975) rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
41 12 U.S.C. § 1715 (Z-l) (1969). This program was designed to encourage the construction 
of rental and cooperative housing for lower income families. Under this program, the federal 
government insured mortgages and made payments to the owners to reduce their financial 
costs to 1%. The owner was obligated to pass on the savings to the tenants in the form of 
reduced rents. See C. EDSON & B. LANE, A PRACI'lCAL GUIDE TO Low- AND MODERATE IN-
COME HOUSING (1972); also Federal Low Income Rental Housing, 2 TEx. S.U.L. REv. 64 (1972). 
The program was suspended in 1973. An alternative kind of financial assistance is now 
provided by § 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f 
(Supp. V 1975). 
42 All of the land surrounding the fifteen acres was zoned R-3 (single family) Metropolitan 
Housing Dev. Corp. V. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,411 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 
97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
4> Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 210 
(N.D. Ill. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
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live in Arlington Heights. 44 
The district court refused to consider whether a racially discrim-
inatory motive had been involved in the zoning denial. Rather, the 
court stated "motives are irreletive if the effect is illegal."45 On that 
basis, the court found that, although the failure to rezone might 
have affected some blacks individually, the decision discriminated 
against low income people generally. 48 Since the court refused to 
recognize wealth as a suspect classification, or housing as a funda-
mental right, the zoning commission's action was not required to 
meet the compelling interests test.47 The court instead accepted the 
defendant's evidence that the zoning change from single-family to 
multi-family districts would depart from the comprehensive zoning 
plan, which established buffer zones between industrial and resi-
dentialland use.4S The court held that this justification constituted 
44 There was testimony that the number of jobs in the Arlington Heights area had doubled. 
Only 137 of the 13,000 people who worked in Arlington Heights were black, due, in part, to 
the unavailability of affordable housing, 517 F.2d at 414 n.2. MHDC alleged violation of the 
following federal statutes: Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974) "All persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and 
Territory to make and enforce contracts. . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of ... property as is enjoyed by white citizens .... "; the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1974) "All citizens of the United States shall have the 
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof, to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."; the Civil Rights Act of 
1871,42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974): 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any state . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen. . . to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law. . . or other proceeding for redress. 
and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1973) "It is the policy of the 
United States to provide, within Constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the 
United States." 
The district court did not consider the Fair Housing Act since no section was specifically 
pleaded, and the court did not think any section applicable to the facts of the case. 373 F. 
Supp. at 209 . 
.. [d. at 210 . 
.. [d. 
" [d. at 209. The court stated: 
The legal issue on this point, therefore, is whether low-income minorities have a constitu-
tional right to live in an area where they work or desire to seek work. Even more broadly, 
do low-income workers have a constitutional right to low-rental housing either where they 
work or elsewhere? We know of no such rule of law. 
[d. at 211 . 
.. The Village's Comprehensive Plan had been in effect since 1959 and provided that an 
area could be zoned R-5 (multi-family) only if it constituted a buffer zone between high and 
low intensity uses. The property leased by MHDC was situated in the middle of an area 
completely composed of single-family residences. See 517 F.2d at 411. 
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a reasonable basis for the village's refusal to rezone and ruled in 
favor of the defendants"· 
MHDC appealed this decision claiming that the racially discrim-
inatory effect of the zoning decision must be analyzed in light of the 
pervasive racial segregation in Chicago and its suburbs. In this con-
text, the petitioners asserted that the refusal to rezone perpetuated 
racial segregation in Arlington Heights. MHDC emphasized that 
the community was almost completely white, and that no other 
plans existed for construction of integrated low income housing.50 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court 
but disagreed with a claim by MHDC that Arlington Heights ad-
ministered its zoning policy in a discriminatory manner.51 The court 
agreed with the district court's ruling that proof that a certain per-
centage of those affected by the zoning decision were black did not 
constitute a sufficient racially discriminatory effect to trigger the 
compelling interests test.52 The court, however, did agree that the 
zoning refusal perpetuated residential segregation in Arlington 
Heights.53 Even though the community had not created the segre-
gated housing pattern, it bore responsibility for the exploitation of 
the problem by legislative action or inaction.54 The court stated: 
Because the Village has so totally ignored its responsibilities in the past 
we are faced with evaluating the effects of governmental action that has 
rejected the only present hope of Arlington Heights making even a small 
contribution toward eliminating the pervasive problem of segregated 
housing. We, therefore, hold that under the facts of this case Arlington 
Heights' rejection of the Lincoln Green proposal has racially discrimina-
.. 373 F. Supp. at 211-212. 
58 517 F.2d at 412. The court volunteered the statistic that the population of Arlington 
Heights in 1970 was 64,884 but only twenty-seven residents were black. [d. at 413-14. 
II Although there were sixty zoning changes to R-5 since the inauguration ofthe buffer zone 
policy, the court found only four instances where there was a clear violation of that policy. 
On the other hand, there were several instances where a zoning change had been rejected on 
the basis of that policy. [d. at 412 . 
.. The court based this holding on the precedent set by the Supreme Court in James v. 
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). This California case challenged the constitutionality of a 
provision that required state-developed low-income housing projects to be approved by refer-
endum. The Court in James held that since the projects would not be wholly occupied by 
one racial minority, but rather by low-income persons in general, the law did not amount to 
impermissible racial discrimination. [d. at 141. 
.. 517 F.2d at 414. 
54 [d. at 413, citing, Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974). See text at note 219, infra. 
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tory effects. It could he upheld only if it were shown that a compelling 
public interest necessitated the decision.55 
Since the court did not find the integrity of the comprehensive 
zoning plan or the prospect of deflated property values to be suffi-
ciently compelling, the court held that the refusal to grant the zon-
ing change violated the equal protection clause. 58 
The court of appeals decision in Arlington Heights was based 
upon a finding of discriminatory effect rather than upon a consider-
ation of the motives behind the Plan Commission's refusal to re-
zone. In so holding, Arlington Heights conformed with other recent 
equal protection decisions, including several zoning cases,51 Never-
theless, the Village appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. 
The grant of certiorari58 made Arlington Heights one of the very few 
zoning cases to have ever been considered by the Supreme Court, 59 
and the first zoning challenge based on racial discrimination to 
reach the high court since Buchanan v. Warley in 1917.60 
After Arlington Heights was accepted for review, but before oral 
arguments were heard,'! the Supreme Court decided Washington v. 
Davis. 82 This decision signalled the result which the Court reached 
in Arlington Heights. Because Davis reshaped the equal protection 
standard of review, analysis of the holding in Davis is necessary in 
order to understand the holding in Arlington Heights. 
55 517 F.2d at 415. 
5' [d. 
57 See, Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972)(school desegregation); 
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972)(public employment); Hawkins 
v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd on rehearing, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 
1972)(municipalservices); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970)(zoning); United States v. City of Black Jack, 
508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974)(zoning). See text at notes 223-31, infra. 
51 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 423 U.S. 1030 (1975). 
50 Following Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, see text at note 13, supra, the 
Supreme Court reviewed a zoning ordinance in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 
(1928) and found that it bore no substantial relation to public health and safety. The next 
zoning case to reach the Supreme Court came almost fifty years later in Village of Belle Terre 
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). This case challenged an exclusionary zoning provision which 
was upheld by the Court using the more passive reasonable basis test. A recent zoning case 
to reach the Supreme Court was Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The Court never 
reached the substantive issues in Warth because it held that all of the plaintiffs lacked 
standing . 
.. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
" Oral argument was heard on October 13, 1976.45 U.S.L.W. 3302 (1976) . 
.. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court decided Washington v. Davis on June 7, 1976. 
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C. Washington v. Davis: Setting a New Standard 
Washington v. Davis was a straight-forward Title VII83 employ-
ment discrimination case. The district court84 and the court of ap-
peals85 based their decisions on the Title VII standards for judging 
the discriminatory character of certain test requirements for jobs." 
It was not until the Davis case reached the Supreme Court that the 
broad equal protection issues were raised87 and its relationship to 
Arlington Heights was established. 
The plaintiffs in Davis claimed that a test, administered to pro-
spective District of Columbia Police Department recruits, was ra-
cially discriminatory because it excluded a high proportion of black 
applicants.88 Both the district court and the appeals court accepted 
this fact as sufficient under Title VII standards to shift the burden 
to the defendant police department to prove that the test was a 
"business necessity" based on its reasonable relationship to job per-
formance. 89 The district court held that the test had met this busi-
ness necessity standard because it measured skills which would be 
required of police officers.7o Moreover, on the basis of statistics pre-
sented by the police department, the test did not invidiously dis-
criminate against blacks.71 The court of appeals reversed and di-
rected summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the grounds 
that defendants had not shown that the test had a substantial rela-
tion to job performance. Without this showing, the discriminatory 
impact rendered the test invalid under Title VII.72 
The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the court of appeals 
had confused the constitutional and statutory claims and had erro-
neously decided the equal protection issue by the application of 
Title VII standards.73 It was in the context that the Supreme Court 
II Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Supp. IV 1974). 
14 Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 512 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 
rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) . 
.. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) . 
.. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See text at notes 214-217, infra . 
., Although suit was brought under Title vn which was inapplicable to the federal govern-
ment at the time the suit was filed, Title vn standards dominated the case until its appeal 
to the Supreme Court. See 426 U.S. at 236-37 n.6, 238 n.10. 
13 [d. at 233. 
II 348 F. Supp. at 16; 512 F.2d at 959-60. 
7. 348 F. Supp. at 17. 
71 [d. 
7' 512 F.2d at 965. 
73 426 U.S. at 238. 
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clarified the grounds upon which a statute or regulation, neutral on 
its face, can be deemed racially discriminatory in violation of the 
equal protection clause,14 
The Court held that the constitutional standard for deciding cases 
alleging invidious racial discrimination was not the same as the 
statutory standards, and, since the appeal had been on constitu-
tional grounds, the constitutional standard should have been ap-
plied.75 The Court stated that a law or other official act would not 
be unconstitutional solely on a finding of racially discriminatory 
impact.78 The Court cited a number of cases in which proof of an 
equal protection violation had required the showing of discrimina-
tory legislative purpose.77 
The Court recognized the difficulties inherent in demonstrating 
discriminatory motivation and enumerated a number of methods 
to construct such proof.78 The Court distinguished Palmer v. 
Thompson78 and Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia80 which 
seemed to have warned against an inquiry into legislative motiva-
tion. The Court then criticized lower court cases which seemed to 
hold that proof of discriminatory motivation was unnecessary in 
cases alleging an equal protection violation.sl Mr. Justice Brennan, 
in his dissent, disapproved of such a "laundry list, "8Z particularly 
since it included the court of appeals decision in Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp. v. Arlington Heights which the Supreme 
Court had already accepted for review.83 To the extent that the 
" [d. at 239-40. 
7. "We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidi-
ous racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we 
decline to do so today." [d. at 239. 
71 [d. 
77 [d. at 239-40, citing, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Akins v. Texas, 325 
U.S. 398 (1945); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 
U.S. 189 (1973). 
78 426 U.S. at 241-42. 
71 403 U.S. 217 (1971). The Court upheld a Jackson, Miss., ordinance which had closed five 
city-owned swimming pools rather than operate them on a desegregated basis. The Court held 
that there was no discriminatory impact since the pools were now closed to everyone. The 
Court refused to consider motivation as the determining factor in establishing a prima facie 
case of racial discrimination . 
.. 407 U.S. 451 (1972). The Court held that the division of a school district had the effect 
of interfering with federal desegregation decrees. Whether the division was racially motivated 
was not considered. 
81 426 U.S. at 244-45 n.12. 
8. [d. at 257-58 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
83 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975). 
74 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:63 
Arlington Heights appeals court based its decision upon a finding 
that the challenged zoning ordinances would exert a discriminatory 
impact on racially segregated housing patterns in metropolitan Chi-
cago, the Arlington Heights issue was settled by the Court in Davis. 
III. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp.: THE SUPREME COURT OPINION 
Before proceeding to the merits of the Arlington Heights case, the 
Court considered whether MHDC had asserted a "judicially cogniz-
able injury"84 which would give it standing within the constitutional 
limitations set forth in Warth v. Selden. 85 Although standing had 
not been an issue in either of the Arlington Heights lower court de-
cisions, Warth, a zoning case in which none of the plaintiffs were 
found to have standing to present their claims of discrimination, 
was so factually similar that the Court reviewed the standing re-
quirements here. 88 
Although the Court had no problem in identifying the economic 
injury to MHDC,87 it did have difficulty establishing whether the 
corporation could assert the third party claims of racial discrimina-
tion for its prospective tenants. Rather than decide this issue, the 
Court recognized the rights of an individual black plaintiff who had 
joined with MHDC's suit on the basis that the Village's zoning 
refusal foreclosed his opportunity to live a reasonable distance from 
where he was employed.88 Thus, the standing issue was resolved 
within the extremely literal interpretation of injury demanded by 
the Warth decision.89 
.. Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975). 
os [d. at 490-518. 
s, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555, 561 
(1977). 
87 [d. at 561. The Court held that the suspension of § 236 housing projects did not preclude 
MHDC from procuring alternate financial assistance under the supplemental § 8 program. 
Thus, construction was a likelihood if the zoning impediments were removed. The Court also 
found that MHDC had invested a great deal of money in plans designed specifically for 
Lincoln Green which would be worthless if a refusal to rezone frustrated construction 
plans. 
ss [d. at 562-63. The plaintiff was employed at the Honeywell plant in Arlington Heights, 
but, due to the lack of low- or moderate -income housing, he lived twenty miles away in 
Evanston. At trial, Ransom asserted his interest in obtaining housing in the proposed Lincoln 
Green project . 
.. For a thorough discussion of the standing requirements in the Warth decision, see Com-
ment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Zoning in the Federal Courts, 17 B.C. IND. & 
COMM. L. REv. 347 (1976). 
1977] EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 75 
Turning to the consideration of the merits of the case, Mr. Justice 
Powell, writing the opinion for a five-man majority,90 immediately 
reiterated the Washington v. Davis standard of review for an equal 
protection claim of racial discrimination. Although disproportionate 
impact may be used as a factor to determine intent, "[p]roof of 
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause."91 The discriminatory purpose 
does not have to be the sole motivating factor in a legislative or 
administrative determination. 92 However, the Court did not allow 
proof of a discriminatory secondary purpose, standing alone to trig-
ger the compelling interest test. In a footnote at the end of the 
opinion, almost as an afterthought, the Court held that when such 
a purpose is shown, the burden shifts to the decision-making body 
to establish that the same result would have been reached absent 
the impermissible purpose. 93 
In an attempt to clarify the means by which discriminatory intent 
can be established, the Court suggested some specific criteria which 
could be considered. The discriminatory administration of a statute 
or regluation would render it unconstitutional, as the Court held in 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 94 One or all of the following factors could be 
determinative of a racially discriminatory intent: the historical 
background of a decision which might reveal a pattern of discrim-
ination; or a sequential consideration in which a sudden shift from 
the norm might demonstrate a discriminatory purpose; or an inves-
tigation into the legislative or administrative history surrounding 
the decision-making. 95 Motivational analysis is not exhausted by 
these considerations, but the Court found them sufficient to decide 
whether discriminatory intent had been a factor in the Village's 
refusal to rezone in Arlington Heights. 
The Court noted that both of the lower courts in Arlington 
Heights had considered and rejected a finding of discriminatory 
motives in the Village's decison. 96 In addition, the Court applied its 
D. Joining Mr. Justice Powell in the majority opinion were Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice 
Stewart, Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rhenquist. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
" [d. at 563. 
" The Court acknowledged the difficulty in ascertainment of a primary motive of a legisla-
tive or administrative body. [d. at 4077 n.11, citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973), 
to support the decision that the discriminatory purpose need not be dominant. 
93 97 S. Ct. at 566 n.21. 
.. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
95 97 S. Ct. at 564-65. 
" [d. at 565. 
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own criteria to the evidence. There was no break in the ordinary 
sequence leading to the Village's zoning decision which might have 
indicated a suspect motivation. There was nothing in the official 
reports of the hearings of the Plan Commission that would prove 
intentional racial discrimination in the resultant decision. Finally, 
there was no inconsistency in the administration of the buffer zone 
policy indicating a discriminatory purpose in the zoning denial for 
Lincoln Green.97 Finding that MHDC had not proven a discrimina-
tory motive behind the Village's decision, the Court held that the 
zoning denial had not violated the equal protection clause. Since 
the statutory claim of discrimination in violation of the Fair Hous-
ing Act had not been considered by the court of appeals, the Su-
preme Court remanded the case for consideration under this stan-
dard.98 
Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Brennan, while concurring 
with the standing analysis of the restatement of the Davis standard 
of review, disagreed with the majority's application of this new 
equal protection test to the facts of this case. These Justices consid-
ered the court of appeals a better forum for such an application and 
stated that the case should have been remanded for a determination 
of the constitutional as well as statutory issue." 
Mr. Justice White dissented from the majority opinion in its en-
tirety on procedural rather than substantive grounds. Since the 
Washington v. Davis opinion was rendered following the court of 
appeals decision in Arlington Heights,IOO he would have had the 
Supreme Court vacate the appeals court judgment and remand the 
case for consideration in light of the new constitutional standard set 
forth in Davis. White stated that it was not necessary to refine this 
standard through repetition and development, and he noted that 
the usual Supreme Court practice is to remand in the event of an 
intervening decision. lol 
In the immediate future, the Arlington Heights decision will exert 
a profound impact on challenges to exclusionary zoning in the 
courts. To determine whether the equal protection clause can still 
be used as an effective vehicle for such a challenge or whether the 
t7 [d. at 565-66 . 
.. [d. at 566 . 
.. Ed. at 566-67. 
'00 The Arlington Heights Court of Appeals decision was announced on June 10, 1975 and 
Washington v. Davis was decided a year later, on June 7, 1976. 
,., 97 S. Ct. 555, 567 (White, J., dissenting). 
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Arlington Heights and Davis standard demanding proof of discrimi-
natory motivation will be insurmountable in most zoning cases, an 
investigation into motivational analysis beyond that considered by 
the Supreme Court must be undertaken. 
IV. MOTIVATION: AN ANALYSIS 
A. Motive or Purpose: A Definitional Problem 
The Court in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights used the 
words "purpose" and "motive" interchangeably. 102 This usage is not 
unusual for the Supreme Court; the Court has never made a defini-
tional distinction between the two terms, and has used one when 
meaning the other in a number of cases. 103 Many commentators and 
lower courts consider the distinction an important one which has 
become crucial in an investigation of what is now required to allege 
discrimination in a zoning decision. The main difference between 
"purpose" and "motive" is that purpose signifies what one means 
to do; motive connotes why one means to do it. In terms of proof, 
purpose is objectively ascertainable, while motive must necessarily 
be subjectively analyzed. To determine legislative purpose, a court 
may look at the terms of a statute, its operation, and its effect. 
Motivation, on the other hand, involves an analysis of the consider-
ations which led the legislators to vote as they did. 104 Professor Ely, 
in an article on legislative motivation, defines the distinction more 
caustically: "By and large, the term 'purpose' has served as nothing 
more useful than a signal that the court is willing to look at motiva-
tion, 'motive' as a signal that it is not."105 
The reason for Professor Ely's belief that the question is whether 
or not the court will consider motivation is that, unless a particular 
statute can be traced to a single legislative objective, discriminatory 
purpose will be very difficult to prove without reference to an imper-
missible motive. One case which was resolved on the basis of racially 
discriminatory purpose without consideration of legislative motiva-
tion was Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the famous Tuskegee gerrymander 
,." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). In distinguishing Palmer v. Thompson, the 
Davis Court uses the two words in the same sentence, as "purpose or motivation." 426 U.S. 
at 243. 
'113 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-86 (1968). 
'04 See, Developments, supra note 25, at 1091-94. 
'0' Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 
1205, 1217 (1970). 
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case in 1960.101 In Gomillion, Justice Frankfurter applied objective 
criteria and found that the sole purpose of the legislation was an 
unconstitutional denial of the right to vote. 107 But Gomillion is the 
exception that proves Professor Ely's rule. l08 The search for legisla-
tive motive is rarely satisfied by external evidence and the Supreme 
Court recognized this in Arlington Heights. "Absent a pattern as 
stark as that in Gomillion . .. ,impact alone is not determinative, 
and the Court must look to other evidence."109 Particularly in the 
field of zoning, the ability to isolate one certain legislative purpose 
without reference to motivation would be practically impossible. 
For this reason, this article will consider the problems inherent in 
judicial review of legislative motivation on the assumption that the 
Arlington Heights standard requires a finding of discriminatory 
motive, not discriminatory purpose. 
B. Problems in Ascertainment of Motivation 
Justice Cardozo once stated, "There is a wise and ancient doc-
trine that a court will not inquire into the motives of a legislative 
body or assume them to be wrongful. "110 The Supreme Court has 
reiterated this philosophy in cases spanning the years from 1810111 
to 1971.112 Now, at least in terms of racial discrimination and the 
equal protection clause, legislative motivation has become a proper 
subject for judicial inquiry. The reason for this ambivalence is that 
determination of motivation, especially in a charge of racial dis-
crimination, is difficult and unreliable. Legislative motives are 
almost always complex and are very often unexpressed. The Court 
in both Davis1l3 and Arlington Heights 1l4 attempted to minimize the 
difficulties with specific examples of methods to determine motiva-
tion. But there is no satisfactory formula which can be applied in 
, .. 364 u.S. 339 (1960). 
'07 [d. at 341. 
, .. For an interesting discussion of the ascertainment of "purpose" in Gomillion and where 
it stands as precedent, see BICKEL, supra note 22, at 210-12. 
, .. 97 S. Ct. at 564. 
"' United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935) (Cardozo, J., di88enting). 
"' Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Justice Marshall held that the question 
of intent could not be raised concerning possible political corruption in a land grant made 
by the Georgia legislature. This was a pure case of subjective legislative motivation, not 
concerned with establishing whether the purpose of the act was constitutional. 
'" Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); see note SO, supra. 
II. 426 U.S. at 241-43. 
II. 97 S. Ct. at 564-65. 
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all instances. An examination of the methods which the Court sug-
gests demonstrates that they may often be problematical and inex-
pedient. 
The Arlington Heights Court recognized that one clear way to 
establish the motivation of those who passed the allegedly discrim-
inatory rule is to examine the statements made by the legislators, 
or by their constituents, prior to the rule's enactment. The Court 
also took notice of one objection to judicial review of motivation: 
it intrudes improperly into the separate but equal legislative 
branch.1I5 There is no satisfactory solution offered by the Court to 
the constitutional roadblock of the separation of powers and, in 
fact, the district court did not allow MHDC to question the Village 
Board members concerning their motivations when they voted to 
refuse the zoning change.1I8 
Beyond the constitutional problem,1I7 there exist other substan-
tive and procedural difficulties. The only possibility of determining 
legislative motivation would be to cross examine each legislator 
concerning his vote, a process untenable in representative govern-
ment. The people whom the legislator represents are entitled to an 
explanation of his vote, based on the fact that his vote is their vote. 
Any accountability beyond that relationship violates the represent-
ative function of the legislator. Expediency is also significant; if the 
legislators were forced to state their reasons to the court for every 
controversial vote, very little legislation would be enacted.1I8 In ad-
dition, a complication arises in the determination of how many 
legislators must have a discriminatory motive to render the act 
impermissible. The courts have generally resolved this problem on 
an ad hoc basis, relying on the general rule that, if a majority of 
legislators express a discriminatory motive, the act is unconstitu-
tional.lI9 
The impropriety which an inquiry into legislative motivation 
implies is not present in a similar inquiry into administrative mo-
tives. The Davis Court approved a finding of a racially discrimina-
11. The Court also offered this contradictory statement; "In some extraordinary instances 
t~e members might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the 
official action, although even then such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege." [d. 
at 565 . 
• " [d. at 566 n.20. 
117 For an indepth analysis of this issue, see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to 
the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95. 
118 See BICKEL, supra note 22, at 215. 
m Ely, supra note 105, at 1219-20. 
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tory purpose through an examination of the administration of a 
rule. 120 This analysis avoids the problem of intrusion into a coordi-
nate branch of the government, and the whole discovery process also 
becomes much simpler.121 In an administrative body, the court is 
dealing with a more manageable number of people who are specifi-
cally concerned with the implementation of the allegedly discrim-
inatory rule. Also, the court may more easily infer a discriminatory 
purpose of an administrative body from a discriminatory effect, as 
it did in Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 122 A law may have been enacted based 
upon many different motives and it may produce more than one 
effect. The administration of the law, however, is more straightfor-
ward; the administrator is attempting to implement the purpose of 
the rule by producing the desired effect. As Professor Bickel suc-
cinctly phrased it, when the court deals with motive at the legisla-
tive level, it is dealing with it "wholesale;" at the administrative 
level, it is "retail."123 Because a determination oflegislative motiva-
tion involves these substantive and procedural problems, motiva-
tion inquiry arguably should be confined to administrative officials. 
Assuming that the officials do not publicly commit themselves to 
a racially discriminatory motive, the Court suggests other, less tang-
ible, ways of determining motivation. 124 If the law or ordinance de-
parts from traditional procedures established by the governing 
body, a suspect motivation could be assumed. The existence of deci-
sions in other areas of government which would fit the challenged 
rule into a mosaic of discriminatory conduct would probably be 
sufficient to establish a proscribed motive. Also, the sequence of 
events should be taken into account. If a requested zoning change 
immediately precedes a city's adoption of a Master Land Use Plan 
which designates the use of the land in question as a park, the 
discriminatory motives behind the zoning change denial may be 
inferrable from this sequence of events. 125 All of these factors are 
circumstantial. In criminal law, such evidence would be enough to 
'211 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Both the Davis and Arlington Heights Courts discussed, as dicta, 
appropriate methods of establishing racially discriminatory motive or, in the rare case, pur-
pose. Both Courts mention Yick Wo v. Hopkins as an example of the ability to discern 
discriminatory purpose from the administration of a statute. [d. at 241 and Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S.Ct. at 564 . 
• 22 118 U.S. 356 (1886) . 
• 23 BICKEL, supra note 22, at 217 . 
• " 97 S. Ct. at 564-65. See also Brest, supra note 117, at 119-24 . 
• 28 United Farmworkers v. Fla. Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 
807 (5th Cir. 1974). 
1977] EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 81 
determine intent. 128 In dealing with the acts of governmental bodies, 
however, which are presumed to be constitutional, basing motiva-
tion upon such criteria is somewhat more problematical. 
An examination of the Court's methods of motivational research 
reveals that any complaintant alleging an equal protection violation 
must sustain a difficult burden of proof. Beyond this threshold diffi-
culty, an exclusionary zoning challenge faces special circumstances 
in addition to those found in other equal protection challenges. A 
consideration of these facts in light of the basic problems in ascer-
tainment of motivation will determine whether the Arlington 
Heights case has effectively foreclosed the use of the equal protec-
tion clause in attempts to eradicate discriminatory zoning. 
C. Motivational Analysis in Zoning Cases 
There are two overlapping aspects of a zoning decision which 
operate to frustrate a motivational analysis: the private nature of 
the proceedings and the temptation of zoning officials to structure 
their policies to conceal impermissible motives. Zoning decisions are 
most often made behind closed doors with no published, or readily 
obtainable, report of the meeting. 127 These decisions are often pre-
ceded by open hearings in which those who would be affected by the 
decisions are invited to speak. A public hearing was held prior to 
the zoning decision in the Arlington Heights case, and some mem-
bers of that community spoke in opposition to opening the com-
munity to low income and minority people. 128 In the search for legis-
lative motivation, the difficulty lies in attributing the motives of the 
community to the decision-making body. There are instances, how-
ever, when just such a showing can be made. In Dailey v. City of 
Lawton,129 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district 
court's finding of racial discrimination in a failure to grant a zoning 
change. The denial was based upon a petition which had been circu-
lated in opposition to the change. The court stated, "In our opinion, 
it is enough for the complaining parties to show that the local offi-
cials are effectuating the discriminatory designs of private individu-
'" See BICKEL, supra note 22, at 214. 
m See BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN, supra note 6. 
". 97 S. Ct. at 559. The Court stated, "Some of the comments, both from opponents and 
supporters, addressed what was referred to as the 'social issue' - the desirability or undesir-
ability of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights low and moderate income housing, 
housing that would probably be racially integrated." [d. 
,29 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970). 
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als."130 Zoning ordinances which are subjected to a public referen-
dum can provide the court with possible evidence of electorate 
objectives upon which the court can base a finding of discriminatory 
motivation. 131 This would depend on whether the wording of the 
referendum was explicit enough to determine the significance of a 
positive or negative note. In general, however, such empirical evi-
dence linking the will of the majority with the actions of the zoning 
officials is not available, and the private, self-contained nature of a 
zoning board decision will frustrate motivational investigation. 
In Palmer v. Thompson,132 Mr. Justice Black pointed out the dif-
ficulties of ascertaining motivation. Then he stated a further diffi-
culty adding to the investigatory problem: 
Furthermore, there is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to 
invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law 
is struck down for this reason, rather than because of its facial content 
or effect, it would presumably by valid as soon as the legislature or 
relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons. 133 
It can be argued that futility is not the proper characterization for 
the very real problem he describes. A satisfactory solution exists in 
the event of a careful redrafting of a rule previously found unconsti-
tutional on the basis of a discriminatory motive. The court could 
enjoin a legislature or relevant governing body from repassing the 
same rule unless the decision-makers present persuasive evidence 
that circumstances have changed or that the passage of time or 
personnel has signaled a change in attitude.134 But investigators of 
legislative or administrative motivation, particularly those con-
cerned with zoning decisions made behind closed doors, are faced 
130 [d. at 1039 . 
• 3. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)(each low income housing project to be 
approved by referendum); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)(Proposition no. 14 on the 
California ballot giving individuals the right to discriminate in the sale of privately-owned 
real estate). Contra, Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. V. City of Union City, 424 
F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970) in which there was a city-wide referendum. The court held: 
If the voters' purpose is to be found here, then it would seem to require far more than a 
simple application of objective standards. If the true motive is to be ascertained not 
through speculation but through a probing of the private attitudes of the voters, the 
inquiry would entail an intolerable invasion of the privacy that must protect an exercise 
of the franchise. 
[d. at 295 . 
• 32 Palmer V. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
133 [d. at 225 . 
• 31 See Brest, supra note 117, at 126-27. 
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with a more insoluble dilemma. A standard of review based on 
motivation encourages a careful structuring of statements and con-
duct concerning avowed motives on the part of the officials engaged 
in discriminatory conduct. Dishonesty of officials may become a by-
product of motivational analysis which could prevent any showing 
of discriminatory intent by challengers of a zoning ordinance. 135 
There are two considerations, however, which may affect the pos-
sibility of successfully determining motive in a zoning decision. 
First, the question may be raised whether a local zoning board is a 
legislative or administrative body.136 In the case of municipal gov-
ernments, the distinction narrows due to the overlapping functions 
of some municipal authorities. Whether a zoning board should be 
considered "legislative" or "administrative" should depend on 
whether it is considered representative; that is, whether the board 
member is seen to represent a constituency whose wishes he at-
tempts to define and implement. 137 An argument can certainly be 
made that a zoning official is not called upon to account to voters 
for his decisions. 13s This fact would place the local zoning board on 
the administrative side of the fence which would facilitate the judi-
cial review of motivation behind a zoning ordinance. Zoning board 
members could be cross-examined and official minutes of meetings 
could be scrutinized l39 without the traditional deference which 
courts have granted to legislatures. Courts have used this process 
with school boards in efforts to determine the existence of de jure 
school segregation.140 It can be equally as effective in the area of 
zoning. 
Secondly, zoning may be uniquely suited to motivational analysis 
because it offers the opportunity to investigate beyond the chal-
lenged decision to the larger rule which mandated it. Zoning ordi-
nances are almost always rule-generated decisions. 141 Most cities 
and towns have formulated master plans for land use. 142 Conse-
135 See BICKEL, supra note 22, at 215. 
'36 See Developments, supra note 25, at 1097-98. The note discusses the difference between 
legislative and administrative agencies, not zoning boards in particular. 
137 See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 15.00-02 (1976). 
'" See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at § 3.01-08. 
"9 The Arlington Heights Court was willing to do the latter, but not the former. 97 S. Ct. 
555, 566 n.20. 
14" See Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N .Y. 1961), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d 
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961). 
'41 See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at § § 1.12-15. 
,,, See BABCOCK, supra note 11, at 62-86. 
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quently, when a zoning decision is made without reference to an 
existing plan it almost requires judicial inquiry into motivation. The 
plan behind the zoning decision is open to judicial review and, as 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested in United States v. Kahriger, 143 
the merits of the rule may constitute evidence of motivation. 144 Of 
course, this analysis can work against the plaintiff in a zoning chal-
lenge, as it did in the district court decision in Arlington Heights. 
That court found that Arlington Heights' comprehensive zoning 
plan was consistent with the stated objectives of the Village Board 
of Trustees. 145 There are plans, however, in which an impermissible 
motive can be divined, such as the one adopted by the city of Delray 
Beach, Florida, which was in direct opposition to the recommenda-
tions of its own planning expert and which was substituted for one 
which would have permitted a proposed housing project to tie into 
municipal services. 146 
Although these last two considerations can be seen as a glimmer 
of hope for exclusionary zoning challenges faced with proof of a 
discriminatory motive, they are only possible aspects of a zoning 
decision which the courts might consider. On balance, the change 
in standard of review from "effect or impact" to "purpose or mo-
tive" will present great difficulties in mounting an effective equal 
protection challenge to a zoning ordinance. In those specific fact 
situations in which objective criteria may determine intent, the 
difficulties may not be insurmountable, as the Supreme Court in 
Arlington Heights suggested. 147 But, given the usual case of an out-
side developer desiring to build low income and minority housing 
who contests a multi-purpose zoning decision, proof of discrimina-
tory motivation may be impossible. 
,,, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) . 
... [d. at 39 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
'" See text at note 49, supra. 
'" United Farmworkers of Fla. Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 
(5th Cir. 1974). 
'" 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). The Court gave as a possible example Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n 
v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970), which, 
although decided on the basis of discriminatory impact, demonstrated enough objective 
criteria (such as a moratorium on new housing subdivisions and a zoning change to an open 
space area after plans for a low-income housing project became known) to infer discriminatory 
motivation. 97 S. Ct. at 564 n.16. 
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D. The Effect of a Motivation Standard of Review on the 
Relationship between Racial and Economic Discrimination 
85 
Exclusionary zoning has primarily been directed against racial 
and ethnic minorities and the poor.148 Part of this can simply be 
attributed to prejudice, but there are economic reasons for a munici-
pality to discourage the construction of low-cost housing for the 
poor. Low income families increase the demand upon municipal 
services while contributing less tax revenue than wealthier citi-
zens.148 Therefore, public opposition to low rent housing projects has 
been reflected in the negative decisions of local zoning boards. 
Those wishing to challenge the decisions based upon equal protec-
tion violations have had to cope with the established two tier system 
of judicial review. 150 
In order to have the burden shifted to the defendants to show a 
compelling state interest for the zoning decision, wealth must be 
regarded by the courts as a suspect classification, a possibility re-
jected by the Supreme Court decision in San Antonio School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez. 151 Thus, a law may discriminate on the basis of 
wealth alone as long as it bears a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state purpose and does not abridge any fundamental right. An 
argument can be made, as Mr. Justice Marshall states in his dissent 
in James v. Valtierra,152 that the wealth classification should at least 
be considered quasi-suspect. 153 Some case precedent indicates that 
the Supreme Court, while not shifting the burden, is prepared to 
examine, somewhat more carefully, classifications based on 
wealth. 154 
Since wealth alone is not a suspect criterion, some exclusionary 
zoning challenges have been based on a combination of economic 
discrimination and the violation of a fundamental right. The Su-
preme Court held in Lindsey v. Normet,155 that there was no consti-
, •• See generally UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RiGHTS, TwENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 1-13 (1975). 
, •• See Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 28, at 1667. 
,50 See text at notes 22-39, supra. 
,., 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
,.2 402 U.S. 137 (1971). 
'53 [d. at 144-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
, •• See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Harper v. Virginia 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
'55 405 U.S. 56 (1972). The Court stated, "We do not denigrate the importance of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every 
social and economic iII." [d. at 74. 
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tutional right to housing, and, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 158 
that there was no fundamental right to land use. Therefore, some 
of those wishing to challenge the decision of a zoning board to ex-
clude low income housing have relied on the fundamental right to 
travel which was recognized in Shapiro v. Thompson. 157 This led to 
a great deal of controversy158 but absolutely no success,'59 
While these zoning challenges were failing, the Supreme Court 
seemed to be moving toward a discriminatory impact standard of 
review in racial segregation cases,"o Those dedicated to combating 
exclusionary zoning emphasized the statistical correlation between 
being black and being poor. Many zoning decisions which prevented 
the construction of low income housing affected a disproportionately 
large number of blacks.181 As a consequence, the zoning cases de-
cided by the courts since 1970 have constituted a merger between 
economic and racial classifications in order to trigger the strict scru-
tiny test for equal protection,"z 
This merger has come under increasing attack by the Supreme 
Court. In James v. Valtierra,l83 the Court held that a law, neutral 
on its face, which would have a greater impact on a racial minority, 
but which disadvantaged a larger group of low income families, 
could not be held subject to rigid scrutiny. The Arlington Heights 
lower court decisions distinguished the James v. Valtierra holding. I .. 
The Seventh Circuit found racial discrimination in low income ex-
clusionary zoning by applying another test formulated by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 
, .. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The plaintiffs in this case included the owners of the house which was 
rented in violation of a zoning ordinance. The Court held that municipal restriction of land 
use was not unconstitutional. [d. at 7. 
157 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
, .. See The Right to Travel and Exclusionary Zoning, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 849 (1975); The 
Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use Regulations? 39 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 612 (1972); Judicial Responses to Comprehensively Planned No-Growth Provisions; 
Ramapo, Petaluma and Beyond, 4 ENV. An. 759 (1975). 
,.. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, discussed at note 156, supra and Construction 
Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3473 
(1976). 
'''' See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); and Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 
U.S. 451 (1972). 
,., See, e.g., Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. 
Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971). 
112 See text at note 39, supra. 
'13 402 U.S. 137 (1971). 
'u Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,413 (7th 
Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
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N. Y.185 The Second Circuit not only looked at the zoning decision 
"in its immediate objective but its historical context and ultimate 
effect."188 This test allowed the Arlington Heights appeals court to 
formulate its exploitation theory of racial discrimination. 167 Never-
theless, the Valtierra decision made it difficult to prove that a stat-
ute or ordinance based on, or affecting primarily a wealth classifica-
tion was racially discriminatory. 
The Supreme Court erected another roadblock to impede a chal-
lenge correlating racial and economic discrimination in Warth u. 
Selden. ls8 The Court denied standing to four plaintiffs who sought 
to challenge a zoning ordinance on the basis of its exclusion of low 
income people, and, coincidentally, minority people. The Court 
held that there was no proof that the specific plaintiffs had been the 
victims of racial discrimination, despite objective data showing the 
exclusionary effects which the town's zoning policies had had on 
minorities. The question of standing was decided solely on the issue 
of wealth discrimination. lsB Without reaching the merits, the Court 
in Warth made clear its unwillingness to imply racial discrimination 
from wealth discrimination. 
These serious setbacks to the merger of economic and racial clas-
sifications established the context for the challenge to the zoning 
denial in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp.I?O The Court in this case sidestepped the correla-
tion between race and wealth by granting standing to a black plain-
tiff who claimed an injury as a result of an allegedly racially dis-
criminatory zoning decision. It did not decide whether racial dis-
crimination could be implied from the MHDC's injury; that is, the 
foreclosure of the opportunity to build low income housing in Arling-
ton Heights.I?1 If racial discrimination cannot. be inferred from its 
statistical correlation to economic discrimination, and motivational 
analysis is applied, zoning officials can explicitly state that opposi-
tion to low income housing was a motivating factor in their zoning 
decisions without triggering the application of strict scrutiny. Since 
zoning ordinances not subject to active review are presumed ra-
, .. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970). 
, .. 436 F.2d at 112. 
'O! See Zoning-Equal Protection, supra note 15, at 250-52. 
, .. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
'" [d. at 502. 
'" 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
t7t [d. at 562. 
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tional, the future of challenges to zoning decisions which operate to 
exclude low income housing is fraught with difficulty. In fact, with 
James v. Valtierra,172 Warth u. Selden,173 and Arlington Heights,1H 
the pendulum of the Supreme Court seems to have swung in the 
opposite direction from the expansive equal protection decisions of 
the 1960's. In that decade, the natural expectation of constitutional 
authorities was that the Supreme Court, which had emphasized 
equal opportunity in voting rights, criminal justice, and educa-
tion,175 would extend that opportunity into the area of housing so 
that no citizen, black or poor, would be denied the possibility of a 
decent home. 176 In the wake of the housing and zoning decisions of 
the seventies, the priority which the Supreme Court places on those 
ideals is doubtful. 
V. JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVE TO EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES: 
FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968 
A. Background 
The Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,177 
is a broad comprehensive federal statute enacted to eliminate dis-
crimination in the sale or rental of housing, through private and 
public enforcement powers. 178 The constitutionality of this statute 
has been based on section five of the Fourteenth Amendment which 
gives Congress power to protect the rights guaranteed by the amend-
ment through appropriate legislation,179 and on the Thirteenth 
Amendment which demands the elimination of the "badges and 
incidents" of slavery in the United States. 180 Zoning is included in 
172 402 U.S. 137. See text at notes 164-65, supra. 
173 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See text at notes 169-70, supra. 
'" 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
115 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 
(1963) (criminal process); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
178 Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 
STAN. L. REv. 767, 790 (1969). 
111 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (Supp. III 1973). 
11K In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 417 (1968), the Supreme Court described 
the Fair Housing Act as a "detailed housing law, applicable to a broad range of discriminatory 
practices and enforceable by a complete arsenal of federal authority." 
'" U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. In the Congressional debates prior to the bill's enactment 
it was this section upon which the constitutionality of the fair housing amendment was based. 
See 114 CONGo REc. 2273-75, 2698-2703, 9561-64 (1968). 
, .. As interpreted in Jones V. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See United States 
v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973) in which the court relied upon the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Jones which based the constitutionality of another civil 
rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), upon the authority of Congress to enforce the Thir-
teenth Amendment. Id. at 120. 
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the Fair Housing Act under § 3604181 which proscribes discrimina-
tion in the sale or rental of a dwelling. As defined in § 3602,182 a 
dwelling can include any vacant land which is for sale or rent. Any 
governmental agency which is concerned with housing, or with land 
which is to be used for housing, is required to follow a policy of color-
blindness. 183 
The Washington v. Davis Court specifically differentiated statu-
tory from constitutional standards in racial discrimination cases. 184 
The Arlington Heights case reinforced this holding by implication 
when the Court decided the constitutional issue but remanded the 
statutory issue under the Fair Housing Act. 185 The contention that 
the statutory standard is different from the constitutional standard 
for determining claims of racial discrimination is buttressed by 
the concurring opinion in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Companyl86 which is the only Fair Housing case to reach the Su-
preme Court since the statute's enactment. This case involved 
an appeal from a denial of standing to tenants, one black and one 
white, who were protesting their landlord's perpetuation of a seg-
regated housing situation. The concurring opinion by Mr. Justice 
White emphasized that the statutory basis for the standing to sue 
was much broader than the constitutional one and that absent the 
statute, the plaintiffs could not have maintained their suit. 187 
'" Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (Supp. III 1973). This section reads in part: "It shall 
be unlawful: [tJo refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to 
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 
person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 
'" Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (Supp. III 1973). 
As used in this subchapter: 
(b) "Dwelling" means any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occu-
pied as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered 
for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any such building, 
structure or portion thereof. 
,M3 See Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) and 
Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 473 F.2d 910 
(6th Cir. 1973) . 
... See note 75, supra. But see General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 45 U.S.L.W. 4031 (1976) in 
which Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority of the Court, seemed to indicate that 
the constitutional standards for determining discrimination could be a starting point for 
determining the statutory standards. This is not completely clear since there is later language 
indicating that proof of discriminatory effect can be the standard for a prima facie Title VII 
violation. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring, and Mr. Justice Brennan, dis-
senting, objected to any inference that the Title VII standard of discriminatory effect was 
altered by the constitutional standard requiring proof of discriminatory motive. [d. at 4037. 
'" 97 S. Ct. at 566 (1977) . 
... 409 U.S. 205 (1972) . 
.. 7 [d. at 212 (White, J., concurring). 
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If the statutory standard for proving discrimination in the sale or 
rental of housing is not the same as the constitutional standard, 
questions arise as to the degree of difference, and burden of proof 
which must be sustained by the plaintiff in a Title VIII discrimina-
tory zoning challenge. Absent clear statutory language concerning 
the necessary standard, and without Supreme Court precedent in 
this matter, the statutory standard of review remains uncertain. ISS 
Most courts have interpreted the Trafficante decision as indicating 
that the standard should be liberally formulated to effectuate the 
purpose of the Act, the eradication of discrimination in housing. ls9 
Some courts have specifically stated that the standard should be 
that a prima facie showing of discriminatory effect would shift the 
burden to the defendant who would have to prove that the dis-
criminatory action was necessary.190 If this statutory standard is 
adopted on a wide scale, it could be relied upon by those wishing to 
allege discrimination in exclusionary zoning as an alternative to the 
narrowing standard of review under the equal protection clause. IUO .1 
B. Arguments for the Establishment of Discriminatory Effect as 
the Pri'!la Facie Case for Title VIII Cases 
1. Tests for a Prima Facie Showing of Discriminatory Effect 
In recent years, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has set the 
clearest definition of what constitutes a prima facie case of discrim-
ination in Title VIII cases. That court, in United States v. City of 
Black Jack,191 stated that "the plaintiff need prove no more than 
that the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably results in 
racial discrimination; in other words, that it has a discriminatory 
effect."lu2 The adverbs "actually" or "predictably" described two 
distinct tests previously advanced in Williams v. Mathews Co. 193 for 
determining discriminatory effect. The "actual" test meant that the 
plaintiff demonstrated real evidence of individual discrimination by 
". Compare United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) with Boyd 
v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975). 
1M' See, e.g., United States V. Henshaw Bros., 401 F. Supp. 399, 402 (E.D. Va. 1974); Joseph 
Skillken & C. v. City of Toledo, 380 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Ohio 1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 867 (6th 
Cir. 1975). . 
". See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974); Williams V. 
Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974). 
" •. ' Shortly before printing, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals conditionally approved 
this standard on remand. See note 248, infra. 
". 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). 
'" [d. at 1184. 
'" 499 F.2d 819,826-28 (8th Cir. 1974). 
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the defendant. In the Williams case, it meant that a potential pur-
chaser of land from a real estate developer had met all of the objec-
tive criteria and the sale would have been made if he had not been 
black. ID4 The "predictable" test meant that statistical evidence indi-
cated that the defendants' acts would continue and/or exacerbate a 
pattern of discrimination. In the Williams case, the developer sold 
lots only to those who contracted with "approved" builders who, in 
the past, had only accepted white clients. IDS Many courts have relied 
upon statistical evidence to demonstrate discriminatory effect while 
recognizing that proof based solely on statistics is ope~ to chal-
lenge. ID' The pool from which the statistics are drawn and the figure 
chosen for comparison can determine the result.ID7 For this reason, 
courts have generally based a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion in housing on a combination of actual and statistical evi-
dence. IDs 
The Courts of Appeals in Arlington Heights lDD and Kennedy Park 
Homes Association v. City of La'ckawanna2OO formulated a third test, 
beyond the "actual" or "predictable" tests described in Williams. 
This test relied upon the historical context and the ultimate effects 
of the defendant's action.201 Although this test has not clearly been 
applied to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination under 
Title VITI, it may be so formulated and applied when the court of 
appeals hears the Arlington Heights case on remand. 
2. Legislative History 
One method to determine whether the prima facie standard of 
discriminatory effect should be adopted by the courts in Title VIIT 
actions is to examine the legislative history of the Act to determine 
congressional intent. The Fair Housing Act was passed as a Senate 
II. Id. at 826. 
"' Id. 
, .. Compare United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973) with 
United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp. 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972). See also Bogen 
& Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34 MD. L. REv. 59 (1974). 
'" See Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 
HARv. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 705 (1976). 
10' See Comment, Curbing Exploitation in Segregated Housing Markets: Clark v. Universal 
Builders, Inc., 10 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 705 (1975Y. 
'" Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,414 (7th 
Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
zoo 436 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). 
20' 517 F.2d at 414. 
\ 
/ 
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amendment to a Civil Rights bill which had originated in the 
House.202 Therefore, there are no committee reports, and the legisla-
tive history must be gleaned from floor debates in the House and 
the Senate.203 A study of the debates evinces a congressional in-
tent ,to use the Fair Housing Act as a means of alleviating years of 
de facto segregation.204 Congressmen noted that twenty-two states 
and eighty-four cities and towns already had adopted some form of 
fair housing legislation by 1967.205 These lawe had 'not elimin~ted 
discrimination in housing, however, and broad federal legislation 
was needed.208 The Senate resisted any attempts to limit the Act by 
the requirement of proof of racial preference in the sale of a home 
through a real estate agent. 207 In fact, the Dirksen compromise, 
which was finally adopted, only slightly limited the coverage origi-
nally proposed by the more liberal factions in the House208 and ac-
tually broadened the enforcement powers of the Attorney General. 208 
Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that the purpose of the Fair 
Housing Act was to remedy the effects of racial discrimination as it 
exists in the United States housing market, and that a prima facie 
showing of a discriminatory effect should be sufficient to shift the 
burden to the defendant to justify his action. To adopt a narrower 
202 Title vm was an amendment to H.R. 2516 which was an election year, House·passed 
civil rights workers' protection bill. See Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and 
A Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969). 
203 An examination of the confluence of events outside and inside Congress during the 
period of the debates may be helpful to an understanding of the atmosphere in which the 
amendment was passed: February 1968-Debate on floor of Senate; March I, 1968-Kerner 
Commission Report, supra note 4 (dealing with urban problems'including segregation) was 
released; March 11, 1968-Bill passed Senate and sent back to House with amendments; 
April 4, 1968-Martin Luther King assassinated; April 10, 1968 - House agreed to Senate 
amendments; April 11, 1968 - President Johnson signed bill. See Dubofsky, supra note 202. 
2M A representative statement was made by Senator Edward Brooke (R.-Mass.) on Febru-
ary 6,1968: 
Fair Housing does not promise to end the ghetto; it promises only to demonstrate that 
the ghetto is not an immutable institution ''in America. It will scarcely lead to a mass 
dispersal of the ghetto population to the suburbs; but it will make it possible for those 
who have the resources to escape the stranglehold now suffocating the inner cities of 
America. It will make possible renewed hope for ghetto residents who have begun to 
believe that escape from their demeaning circumstances is impossible. 114 CONGo REc. 
2279 (1968). 
, .. [d. at 3421. 
, .. See, e.g., id. at 2277 (remarks by Sen. Mondale). 
201 [d. at 5221-22 (rejection of Sen. Baker's proposed amendment). 
, .. The amendment was originally proposed by Senator Mondale. See Dubonsky, supra 
note 202. 
m See Dubofsky, supra note 202, at 156-57. 
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standard would be to undermine the congressional intent "to re-
move the walls of discrimination which enclose minority groups in 
ghettos. "210 
3. Statutory Construction 
Another argument for a statutory standard of review based on 
discriminatory effect for individual plaintiffs is that such a standard 
is written into the statute under the enforcement powers of the 
Attorney General. Section 3613211 gives the government the power to 
bring an action for relief whenever it has reason to believe that the 
defendant has engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the 
right to fair housing, or that a group of people have been denied fair 
housing rights and this denial raises an issue of general public im-
portance. The guidelines developed by this action call for a showing 
of discriminatory effect.212 If it is sufficient for the government to 
show that a pattern or practice is prima facie discriminatory in 
effect, the individual plaintiff should bear a standard no more bur-
densome. The government's interest in protecting its citizens from 
discriminatory housing practices is no greater than the individual's 
right to protect himself from such civil rights violations.213 
4. Discriminatory Effect Is the Standard in other Civil Rights 
Legislation 
A third consideration is that the prima facie standard of discrimi-
natory effect has been applied to establish discrimination under 
other civil rights legislation. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964214 has long used the discriminatory effects standard of review 
210 114 CONGo REc. 9563 (1969) (remarks by Rep. Celler). 
211 Fair Housing Act 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (Supp. ill 1973) provides: 
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group 
of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of 
the rights granted by this subchapter. . . and such denial raises an issue of general public 
importance, he may bring a civil action in any appropriate United States district court 
by filing with it a complaint setting forth the facts and requesting such preventive relief, 
including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or 
other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice or denial 
of rights, as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this 
subchapter. 
212 See United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Henshaw Bros. 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1974). 
213 See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). 
m 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Supp. IV 1974). 
\ 
I 
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in employment practices215 which the Supreme Court upheld in 
Griggs u. Duke Power CO.218 in 1971. In this case the Court dealt with 
the question of whether certain test requirements for jobs were ille-
gal where the jobs had previously been given only to whites, 
and the new qualifications, which excluded more blacks than 
whites, were unrelated to job performance. In holding that such 
tests were illegal, the Court declared that "practices, procedures or 
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, 
cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of 
prior discriminatory employment practices."217 According to the 
Court, Title VII proscribes all practices which are discriminatory in 
form or operation unless such practices arise from legitimate busi-
ness necessity. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the court which will rehear 
the Arlington Heights case on the merits of the Title VIII claim, 
extended the Title VII standard in Griggs to cover rights guaranteed 
under another civil rights statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
Section 1982.218 In Clark u. Universal Builders,219 the court found 
that as a result of the racially segregated housing market in Chicago, 
the defendants were able to charge blacks a higher price than whites 
were charged for the same homes. The court held that a prima facie 
case of discriminatory effect had been proven upon a showing that 
such action was an exploitation of a discriminatory situation.220 
Once this standard had been met, "the burden of proof [shifted] 
to the defendants to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the price and term differential. "221 
Since all of the civil rights statutes have the same essential pur-
pose, that is, to eliminate public and private racial discrimination, 
the interpretation which the courts have given to one statute should 
be similar to that given to related statutes.222 Therefore, the Title 
VII prima facie standard of discriminatory effect which the Su-
preme Court approved in Griggs, should be adopted as the standard 
in all civil rights cases alleging racial discrimination, including 
m See EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1975). 
'" 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
217 [d. at 430. 
,,8 See note 46, supra. 
'" 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974). 
220 501 F .2d at 331. 
221 [d. at 334. 
m See 3 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.07 (1974). 
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those exclusionary zoning cases brought under rights guaranteed by 
Title VIII. 
5. Judicial Application 
The Eighth Circuit decision in United States v. City of Black 
Jack 223 affords the most positive instance of the application of this 
statutory standard in a zoning case. The Black Jack case incorpo-
rated all of the fundamentals of an exclusionary zoning challenge; 
the city was within St. Louis County, the suburban areas of which 
were becoming almost exclusively populated with affluent whites, 
while the percentage of blacks in St. Louis was increasing.224 Plan-
ners sought to remedy this disparity by the construction of low 
income housing in Black Jack, one of the St. Louis suburbs.225 When 
this plan was revealed, Black Jack's city council enacted a zoning 
ordinance prohibiting the construction of any new multiple-family 
dwellings. 226 The court held that such action was prohibited by Title 
VIII: "The discretion of local zoning officials ... must be curbed 
where 'the clear result of such discretion is the segregation of low-
income blacks from all-white neighborhoods.' "227 
The Black Jack Court held that the burden of proof in Title VIII 
cases was satisfied by the showing of a racially discriminatory ef-
fect. 22R While proof of a discriminatory purpose would be considered, 
"effect, and not motivation, is the touchstone .... "229 Once a 
racially discriminatory effect was established, a prima facie case 
under Title VIII had been made and the burden shifted to the mu-
nicipality to demonstrate that the ordinance furthered some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory municipal policy of overriding import-
ance. 230 
"3 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). 
'24 [d. at 1183. 
m [d. at 1182. The City was not incorporated until two months after HUD issued a 
"feasibility letter" which gave preliminary approval for federal funding of the low income 
housing. 
", [d. at 1183. The City Council acted within six days of commencing operation as a 
municipal governing body. 
"7 [d. at 1184. The court quoted from the decision of Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 
1180 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973). 
'" United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179,1184 (8th Cir. 1974). 
'" [d. at 1185. 
230 [d. at 1186-87. The court held that the reasons advanced by the city were not sufficiently 
compelling. The three primary interests were road and traffic control, prevention of over-
crowded schools, and prevention of devaluation of adjacent single family homes. 
I 
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It is not certain that this concept of prima facie case based on 
effect rather than motive, will be followed by the other circuit courts 
or by the Supreme Court in Title VIII cases. In fact, the Second 
Circuit refused to adopt this standard in a class action housing case 
decided shortly after Black Jack. 231 The argument is persuasive, 
however, that this standard should be adopted based upon congres-
sional intent, statutory construction, and judicial interpretation of 
other civil rights legislation. If this reasoning prevails, statutory 
challenges of exclusionary zoning under Title VIII may become a 
successful alternative to constitutional zoning challenges in light of 
the difficult motivational standard of the Arlington Heights case. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems clear that the aggressive action taken by the circuit 
courts in striking down exclusionary zoning practices232 is going to 
be severely limited by the new standard of review formulated by the 
Supreme Court in Washir:tgton v. Davis. 233 The decision handed 
down this term in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp. 234 has applied this standard to the first 
equal protection challenge of an allegedly racially discriminatory 
zoning decision to reach the Supreme Court in fifty years. 235 Those 
wishing to attack the constitutionality of exclusionary zoning in 
federal courts are faced with proving a discriminatory motive rather 
than establishing the resultant discriminatory effect. 
This motivational analysis is a more difficult burden to sustain 
because it involves the subjective process of attitude determina-
tion. 23ft Although the Supreme Court in Davis and Arlington Heights 
231 Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975) In this case, the Second Circuit refused 
to find a violation of the Fair Housing Act in the landlord's application of the 90% rule 
requiring a weekly net income equal to at least 90% of the monthly rent. This rule operated 
to exclude almost all public welfare families, a large proportion of whom were black and 
Puerto Rican. The court refused to draw the statistical correlation between wealth discrimi-
nation and racial discrimination and would not adopt a discriminatory effects test. Judge 
Mansfield, in a masterly dissent, urged the adoption of the Griggs effect test for claims of 
Title vrn discrimination in housing. Id. at 1115 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
232 See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974); Joseph 
Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 380 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd, 528 F.2d 867 (6th 
Cir. 1975); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970). 
233 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see text at notes 64-84, supra. 
234 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
235 See text at note 59, supra. 
'38 See text at notes 102-25, supra. 
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gave some guidance for making this determination,237 the standard 
for proving discrimination in zoning may have become too narrow 
for effective use in most zoning challenges. There are three ways in 
which a local zoning board can impede or prevent the entry of mi-
norities into its community: it can subject certain zoning decisions 
to voter aproval through a referendum, it can rezone property which 
has been acquired for minority housing, or it can refuse to rezone 
in order to permit such housing.238 Only the active response ofrezon-
ing lends itself to the immediate proof of discriminatory motivation. 
Since most zoning boards committed to exclusionary tactics have 
avoided the necessity of such obvious action, the success of future 
challenges to such zoning in the courts will be precarious. 
The merger between economic and racial classifications appears 
equally uncertain. The Supreme Court refuses to allow challenges 
of discrimination against low income families under the umbrella of 
strict scrutiny traditionally restricted to challenges of invidious ra-
cial discrimination. 239 There may be societal reasons for this reluct-
ance. Racial discrimination is intolerable in America, while eco-
nomic gradations are basic to the capitalistic structure. Poverty is 
circumstantial and can weigh partially or fully on people; race is 
absolute. Finally, poverty is arguably remediable and one of the 
most purely American concepts is the ability of every man to escape 
the confines of poverty. These considerations, coupled with the judi-
cial attitude that the equal protection clause may have been applied 
too broadly as a cure for all of society's ills, militate against the 
success of an attack of exclusionary zoning based on the correlation 
between racial and economic discrimination. 
Given these setbacks in constitutional challenges of exclusionary 
zoning, reliance must be placed in the statutory guarantees of the 
Fair Housing Act. This legislation was passed to provide a remedy 
for continuing discrimination and segregation in housing and, by 
extension, zoning. As a broad civil rights statute, it has been liber-
ally construed by the courts to effectuate its purposes. It is clear 
that the Act goes beyond the protection afforded by the equal pro-
tection clause and, therefore, the standard to determine the exist-
ence of discrimination in violation of the statute should be broader. 
237 See text at notes 78, 94-95, supra. 
23M See Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 
396, 403-04 (N .D. Ill. 1971). 
239 See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 13 (1971); Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
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Convincing evidence exists that the standard should be the prima 
facie showing of racially discriminatory effect. This standard, which 
has been adopted by the Supreme Court in Title VII cases,240 has 
been applied by lower courts in Title VIII cases.241 If this standard 
is accepted by the Seventh Circuit Court when the Arlington 
Heights case is reheard, MHDC will surely be able to sustain its 
burden of proof of racially discriminatory effect based upon the 
ultimate impact of the segregated Chicago housing market.2f2 This 
success would open the courtroom doors to exclusionary zoning 
challenges, thus rekindling hope which has been weakened by the 
Supreme Court's pronouncements in Davis and Arlington Heights. 
The attack on exclusionary zoning could also be refocused 
through pressures applied to state legislatures. There are limitations 
to attacking exclusionary zoning in the courts, even if the courts 
accept the most liberal standard applicable to the Fair Housing Act. 
One of the main drawbacks is the individualized nature of each 
challenge. Those who wish to put an end to the practice of exclusion-
ary zoning aim for a favorable court ruling with the hope that this 
ruling will have precedential value in succeeding controversies. 243 
Others, with similar goals, look to the state legislatures to provide 
a more comprehensive remedy.244 The Douglas Commission, in its 
report on urban problems, recommended state legislation giving a 
state agency broad review powers over local zoning decisions. 245 Per-
'40 See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) and Bing v. 
Roadway Express, 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973). 
'" See United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Bob Lawrence Realty, 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973); Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 
380 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Ohio 1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975). 
'" See text at note 53, supra. 
243 See Note, The Inadequacies of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 70 
MICH. L. REv. (1976). See also BROOKS, supra note 5, at 27. 
, .. One legislature which has responded is the General Court of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. The Massachusetts statute, MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 403 §§ 20-23 (Supp. 1975), 
was enacted to stimulate the construction of low and moderate income housing in the 
suburbs. Under the terms of the statute, any limited dividend corporation or housing author-
ity intending to build subsidized housing submits one application to a local zoning board of 
appeals. After a public hearing, the board may (1) approve the application and issue a 
comprehensive permit; (2) approve the application with certain conditions or requirements; 
or (3) deny the application. The board must act quickly within a given time or approval is 
automatic. If the application is denied, or if the approval requires conditions which make the 
construction economically unfeasible, the organization can appeal the decision to a state 
agency, the Housing Appeals Committee. See BROOKS, supra note 5, at 31; EQUAL OPPORTUN-
ITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 7, at 53-55. 
,,, Douglas Commission Report, supra note 4, at 239-40. See also Brown, State Land Use 
Laws and Regional Institutions, 4 ENV. AFF. 393 (1975) for proposals to strengthen the powers 
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haps the recommendation of the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights should be followed, which conditions the receipt of federal 
housing and community development grants upon the creation of 
state agencies to oversee local zoning boards.24ft 
Lobbying for such legislation is undoubtedly a long and possibly 
fruitless process, and any statute eventually enacted may be vi-
tiated by amendment.247 For the present, the challengers of exclu-
sionary zoning must rely on the immediate, albeit individualized, 
hope afforded by the rights guaranteed under the Fair Housing 
Act.248 It is on this battlefield that victory appears most promising. 
of regional planning agencies and to redistribute local land use functions. 
2<1 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 7, at 69. 
2" The Massachusetts statute, described supra note 244, which is the only one of its kind 
to date, has been attacked for being too passive by depending on the initiative of the federally-
subsidized organizer. Also, the law excludes profit-making firms and provides loopholes which 
enable local governments to refuse construction of low income housing. See Wilson and Col-
lura: A Setback for Regionalism, 5 ENV. AFF. 477, 492-96 (1976) for description of the short-
comings of Chapter 774 both statutorily and judicially. 
2" The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held, on remand of Arlington Heights, that to 
establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act a showing of discriminatory effect may be 
enough. The sufficiency of such a standard depends upon four factors: (1) the strength of the 
demonstrated discriminatory effect; (2) the extent of the evidenced discriminatory intent 
(although this is the least important factor and can be waived); (3) the nature of the defen-
dants' interest in the proposed action (Le., was it public or private); and (4) the nature of 
the relief sought (affirmative action, as opposed to mere non-interference). 
Although the court of appeals discussed each factor, it instructed the trial court to grant 
relief to the plaintiffs if they could satisfy the first standard; that is, a strong showing of 
discriminatory effect. See Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 
No. 74-1326 (7th Cir. July 7, 1977). 
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